In this paper we study the persistence and predictability of several statistical parameters of individual hedge fund returns. We find little evidence of persistence in mean returns but do find strong persistence in hedge funds' standard deviations and their correlation with the stock market. Persistence in skewness and kurtosis is low but this could be due to the relatively small size of our sample. Despite the observed persistence, our study also shows that in absolute terms hedge funds' risk profiles are not easily predicted from historical returns alone. The true value of a hedge fund's track record therefore appears not to lie in its use as a predictor of future performance and risk, but primarily in the insight that it provides in a fund's risk profile relative to that of other funds in the same strategy group. The availability of a track record is important, but for a different reason than many investors think.
INTRODUCTION
Many investors, private as well as institutional, allocate to different managers based on these managers' historical performance or track record. Relatively good performance is rewarded with a higher allocation, while badly performing managers are replaced. Some institutional investors go as far as to require a new manager to have at least three or even five years of history before they are willing to allocate to that manager. Especially for hedge funds this is quite problematic as most of them have not been around that long and are therefore unable to comply with such a requirement. The weight given to a track record by investors implies that many believe that good and bad performance persists, i.e. that winners will continue to win and losers will continue to lose. Various authors have tested this hypothesis for mutual funds 1 as well as for hedge funds. 2 Measuring performance by the so-called appraisal ratio, i.e. alpha divided by the residual standard deviation from a regression of the individual fund return on the average return of all funds, Agarwal and Naik (2001) report significant persistence in quarterly hedge fund returns over the period [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] . Using data over the period 1990-1998 and measuring performance as the alpha from a six-factor model, Edwards and Caglayan (2001) also find evidence of significant persistence on a one-year as well as a two-year basis. A number of other authors on the other hand, such as Brown et al. (1999) , Peskin et al. (2000) and Schneeweis et al. (2001) for example, find little or no evidence of persistence in hedge fund returns.
One possible explanation for these contradictory conclusions lies in the way in which performance is measured. When the returns generated by a fund are incorrectly adjusted for risk, this may show up as persistence where there is in fact none.
Consider the following example. A fund manager holds the index and at the beginning of every month writes a 1-month at-the-money call option on that same index. The fund's return distribution will be negatively skewed as by writing the call the manager effectively sells off his upside potential. There is nothing special about this strategy.
However, this is not the message we would get if we used the fund's monthly returns to calculate traditional performance measures such as the Sharpe ratio and Jensen's alpha for example. Purely due to the shape of the return distribution, the latter measures would indicate the presence of superior performance where there is none. If subsequently we were to investigate whether this superior performance persisted over time, we would find that this was indeed the case as the manager's strategy and therefore the fund's return distribution is unchanged. Since there is no superior performance to start with, however, it is not the fund's superior performance that persists but simply the fund's risk profile. A similar argument could explain why some authors, including Ackerman et al. (1999) and Edwards and Caglayan (2001) , find a positive relationship between incentive fees and performance. A higher incentive fee will increase the skewness of a fund's return distribution. When performance is measured without taking this into account, this may create the illusion of a positive relationship while the true relationship is flat or even negative. 
THE DATA
In this study we work with monthy net-of-fee hedge fund return data taken from Tremont TASS, one of the largest and best-known hedge fund databases. From the database we selected a total of 324 funds with data available from June 1994 until May 2001. Since hedge funds follow a variety of strategies, it is customary to classify hedge funds in a number of categories depending on the main type of strategy followed. In line with the TASS classification, we classify funds in the following subgroups (with the number of funds in parenthesis): long/short equity (113), event driven (59), global macro (17), emerging markets (26), relative value (31), and funds of funds (78). We use the S&P 500 index as a proxy for 'stocks' and the Salomon Brothers 7-year Government Bond index as a proxy for 'bonds'.
CONTINGENCY TABLES
For the above funds we calculated the mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, i.e. when the Z-statistic is greater than 1.96 the null hypothesis of no persistence is rejected at 5% significance. The CPRs and Z-statistics for the 6 different strategy groups can be found in table 1.
<< Insert Table 1 >>
Starting with the CPRs for the mean, we see that, with the exception of emerging markets and relative value, they are close to 1, with none of them statistically significant (at 5%). We find much more persistence in the standard deviations. The CPRs are extremely high and statistically significant as well. Apart from long/short equity and funds of funds, the CPRs for skewness are all close to 1. Persistence in kurtosis is also low, with in this case relative value providing the outliers. The low persistence in skewness and kurtosis does not come as a complete surprise. Since both these parameters are concerned with the tails of the distribution and extreme events only occur infrequently, they are hard to estimate accurately from a relatively small sample like ours. 4 Consider the following example. A substantial portion of the outstanding catastrophe-linked bonds are held by hedge funds. These bonds pay an exceptionally high coupon in return for the bondholder putting (part of) his principal at risk. Since the world has not seen a major catastrophe for some time now, these bonds have performed quite well and the available return series show relatively little skewness. However, this does not give an accurate indication of the actual degree of skewness as when a catastrophe does eventually occur, these bonds will produce large losses. Looking at the CPRs of the correlation with stocks, we see strong persistence for most strategy groups. Most of the CPRs are statistically significant as well. Apart from long/short equity, we find little or no persistence in the correlation with bonds.
Overall, the contingency table results show that there is significant persistence in the risk profile of hedge funds, with especially the standard deviation and the correlation with stocks standing out. In terms of strategies, the highest persistence is found in long/short equity and the lowest in event driven strategies. This is an interesting conclusion as the return distributions of long/short equity funds tend to be substantially more symmetrical than those of event driven funds. A priori, one would therefore expect to be able to estimate long/short equity funds' parameters more accurately, which is exactly what we find.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
An alternative technique to test for persistence is a cross-sectional regression of the period 2 parameter values on the period 1 parameter values. If the estimated slope coefficient is significantly greater than zero we take that as evidence of persistence.
The results of the 48 regressions for the 6 strategy groups can be found in table 2.
<< Insert Table 2 >>
From table 2 we see that only funds of funds and emerging markets strategies exhibit significant persistence in the mean, although the R-squared of the regressions is very low. It is interesting to see some persistence in the mean returns of fund of funds. This could be interpreted as an indication that some fund of funds managers are able to consistently pick top performers. However, the observed persistence could equally be the result of investment in strategies that show persistence themselves, such as emerging markets for example. Distinguishing between these two explanations will require more insight in the portfolios held by funds of funds than currently available.
As before, we see very pronounced persistence in the standard deviations. All strategy groups test highly significant with a very high R-squared. Apart from long/short equity and funds of funds, there is little evidence of persistence in skewness, while kurtosis only seems to persist in funds of funds. Similar to the standard deviations, all strategy groups show highly significant persistence in their correlation with the stock market accompanied by a very high R-squared. Persistence in the correlation with bonds on the other hand seems low, with long/short equity and funds of funds being the only exceptions.
In sum, the regression results are in line with what we saw before in the contingency tables and indicate significant persistence in hedge funds' risk profiles. Especially the standard deviation and correlation with the stock market show strong persistence. The highest persistence is found in funds of funds and the lowest in relative value strategies.
PREDICTABILITY
So far, we have sorted funds relative to the strategy group median and studied whether funds that score above (below) the median in one period also do so in the next. Doing so, we find clear signs of persistence in hedge funds' risk profiles. A fund that exhibits high (low) risk relative to the median fund can be expected to do so in the future as well. This, however, does not imply that the risk profile of hedge funds in more absolute terms can be easily predicted. To do so we have to be able to predict the median.
To find out more about the predictability of the hedge fund return parameters in question we tested the forecasting power of two simple rules. The first rule (method 1) simply predicts that the period 2 value will be equal to the period 1 value. The second rule (method 2) predicts that the period 2 value will be equal to the average of all period 1 values, where the average is taken over all funds in the same strategy group. To evaluate the quality of both predictors we calculate three different error measures: the mean error (ME), the mean absolute error (MAE) and the root mean squared error (RMSE). The first provides information on possible biases in the predictors in question, while the other two are concerned with its accuracy. The RMSE gives extra weight to relatively large errors. The results can be found in table 3.
<< Insert Table 3 Means are substantially over-estimated and standard deviations and kurtosis levels are very significantly under-estimated. In many cases the MAE and RMSE are higher than the average value of the parameter that is being forecast. From table 3 we also see that there is little difference between both predictors used. Method 2 slightly outperforms method 1 for the mean, skewness, kurtosis, and the correlation with bonds. Method 1 on the other hand does better for the standard deviation and the correlation with stocks. Since the latter tend to be easier to estimate than the mean, skewness and kurtosis, this is not completely unexpected though.
CONCLUSION
Studying the persistence and predictability of several statistical parameters of individual hedge fund returns, we find little evidence of persistence in mean returns.
This suggests that a strategy of allocating only to top performers may not yield a significantly higher return. We do find clear evidence of persistence in hedge fund returns' higher moments, especially in the standard deviation and the correlation with stocks. Persistence in skewness and kurtosis is low, but this may be due to the small size of the sample used. Despite the observed persistence, our study also shows that in absolute terms hedge funds' risk profiles are not easily predicted from historical returns alone. The true value of a hedge fund's track record therefore appears to lie not in its use as a predictor of future performance and risk, but primarily in the insight that it provides in a fund's relative risk profile, i.e. relative to other funds in the same strategy group. The availability of a track record is important, but for a different reason than many investors think. 
